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FOREIGN TRADE ZONES-REGULATION OF FOREIGN COM-
MERCE-GOODS REMAINING EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN FOREIGN TRADE ZONES
ARE SUBJECT TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATIONS UNDER THE LAN-
HAM TRADEMARK ACT. A. T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Plaintiff A.T. Cross Company brought an action against defend-
ants Sunil Trading Corporation (Sunil) and an individual officer of
Sunil, Narsing N. Narson, alleging trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and false designation of origin under the Lanham
Trademark Act.' Specifically, plaintiff charged that defendants pur-
chased bogus Cross pens from the Wang Pao Long Manufacturing
Company of Taiwan, which were then passed through a New York
foreign trade zone for eventual sale in a foreign country as American
products. This use of the foreign trade zone, together with the pro-
curement of false certificates as to the origin of the pens, aided Sunil
in misrepresenting that the pens were manufactured within the
United States. After plaintiff was granted a preliminary injunction
restraining defendants from marketing the pens, defendants con-
tested the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear the dispute.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that since the jurisdiction of the Lanham Trademark
Act was coextensive with the Commerce Clause, absent an express
repudiation of federal jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Zone Act
of 1934,2 the provisions of the Lanham Trademark Act extended to
foreign trade zones. First, the court reiterated that as a sovereign
nation, the United States possessed the inherent "power to impose,
even upon foreigners owing no allegiance, liability for acts done
abroad which proximately cause damage within the territorial limits
of the sovereign." 3 Whether federal jurisdiction existed in this case,
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-1127 (1976).
2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-81u (1976). The statute provides in pertinent part that each
port of entry in the United States shall be entitled to at least one foreign trade zone
wherein foreign goods may be stored, sold, exhibited, broken up, repacked, assembled,
distributed, sorted, graded, cleaned, and even mixed with foreign or domestic mer-
chandise without being subject to the customs laws of the United States, including
the imposition of import duties.
3. 467 F. Supp. at 49 quoting from Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas
Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 600 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958). See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 276 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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then, was to be determined by the legislative intent expressed in the
Lanham Trademark Act.
Second, the court, relying upon the Supreme Court decision in
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.4 and the language within the Lanham
Trademark Act itself,' found the jurisdictional parameters of the Act
to be coextensive with those found under the Commerce Clause.
This definition included jurisdiction "where unfair trade practices
were committed in foreign countries and the sole conduct com-
plained of within the United States was otherwise lawful . ... "
Therefore, Sunil's use of a foreign trade zone as an essential part of
an unlawful scheme taking place outside of the United States, and
its acquisition of false certificates of product origin, sufficiently es-
tablished "a jurisdictional base under the Lanham Act in excess of
the one expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Steele. ",
Finally, the court concluded that since foreign trade zones were
created pursuant to the Commerce Clause and were operated under
the close supervision of United States Customs officials, absent any
express repudiation of federal jurisdiction by the Foreign Trade Zone
Act, Congress did not intend to exclude federal courts from enforcing
the Lanham Trademark Act within foreign trade zones.
This conclusion is consistent with the only other two cases that
qualify federal jurisdiction in the foreign trade zone. In During v.
Valente,' defendant hired plaintiff to locate purchasers for foreign
liquor stored in a New York foreign trade zone. In an action for
breach of contract, a New York court held that the "zone is created
under the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions. This power is exclusive and plenary."' More important, in an
4. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
5. Lanham Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) states:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the con-
trol of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use
of marks in such commerce; . . . to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in
such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or col-
orable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies
stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade
names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States
and foreign nations.
6. 467 F. Supp. at 50.
7. Id. See Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964); Crossbow, Inc. v. Glovemakers, Inc., 265 F.
Supp. 202 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
8. 267 A.D. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944).
9. Id. at 385, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
VOL. 9:141
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
action for wrongful death arising out of an accident occurring within
a foreign trade zone, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana determined in Fountain v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc.'" that the Foreign Trade Zone Act conferred jurisdiction upon
the federal courts only in those cases relating to customs or to en-
forcement of federal regulations concerning foreign commerce." The
court's opinion in the instant case, however, cites During only briefly
and Fountain not at all. Rather, it relies upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Steele, as restricted by two later cases, Vanity Fair Mills,
Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.'" and Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Pal-
mas Food Co.'3
Defendant in Steele was a United States citizen who, while re-
siding in Texas, conducted a watch business in Mexico. Utilizing a
Mexican trademark registration, defendant was able to stamp the
mark "Bulova" on watches composed of parts manufactured in Swit-
zerland and the United States but assembled in Mexico. Bulova
Watch Company, asserting violations of the trademark laws of the
United States, sought injunctive and monetary relief against Steele
in the Western District of Texas. The district court's dismissal of the
action for lack of jurisdiction was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. The Supreme Court upheld the reversal, stating that
federal courts could exercise, through the Lanham Trademark Act,
jurisdiction to enjoin a United States citizen from utilizing unfair
trade practices in foreign commerce, even when those acts which
took place within the United States were not illegal by themselves."
The breadth of the Supreme Court's holding in Steele was lim-
ited by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' finding in Vanity Fair.
Here, an American manufacturer in an action against a Canadian
corporation alleged infringement of a United States trademark by a
Canadian mark. The court held that while Congress' power to regu-
late trade reached commerce among the States and between the
United States and foreign countries, the Lanham Trademark Act
could not be given "extraterritorial application against foreign citi-
zens acting under presumably valid trade-marks in a foreign coun-
try."'" The degree to which federal jurisdiction under the Lanham
Trademark Act could be exercised in foreign commerce, then, was-
10. 265 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. La. 1967).
11. Id. at 635.
12. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
13. 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958).
14. 344 U.S. at 255-56.
15. 234 F.2d at 643.
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not determined by the courts until Ramirez & Feraud Chili. This
case announced that congressional power over commerce extended to
all commerce except that which "does not substantially affect inter-
state or foreign commerce."'' (Emphasis added.)
This line of decisions allows a broad basis for the exercise of
federal court jurisdiction in cases involving unfair trade practices.
By interpreting the jurisdictional reach of the Lanham Trademark
Act to be coextensive with the Commerce Clause, the test for deter-
mining federal court jurisdiction becomes whether or not the ques-
tioned activities substantially affect United States interstate or for-
eign commerce. Jurisdiction does not depend upon whether the
activities carried on in the United States were themselves illegal, nor
does it require that the goods involved actually be introduced into
commerce within the United States. As held by the court in A.T.
Cross, federal courts have jurisdiction even where the goods involved
remain in a foreign trade zone not subject to United States customs
tariff laws. This decision should help protect against the use of
foreign trade zones in schemes utilizing unfair trade practices which
adversely affect United States interstate or foreign commerce.
Matthew P. Jaffe
16. 146 F. Supp. at 601. For clarification of this precept see Miller Brewing Co. v.
Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, (W.D.N.Y. 1978),
wherein the court held:
For jurisdiction to lie over goods bearing the [alleged infringing] mark,
they must have been sold or transported in interstate commerce (either
within the United States or between the United States and a foreign
country) or, if in intrastate or entirely foreign commerce, there must
have been a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 442-43.
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